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Abstract
We propose an axiomatic approach which economically underpins the representa-
tion of dynamic intertemporal decisions in terms of a stochastic dynamic utility func-
tion, sensitive to the information available to the decision maker. Our construction
is iterative and based on time dependent preference connections, whose characteriza-
tion is inspired by the original intuition given by Debreu’s State Dependent Utilities
(1960).
Keywords: intertemporal decisions, stochastic dynamic utility, conditional preferences,
sure thing principle.
1 Introduction
The criterium which leads the decisions of every agent, intervenes in many aspects of real
life, determining the economical, political and financial dynamics. For this reason the
psychological analysis and the mathematical axiomatization of the agents’ behavior has
gained a lot of interest, leading to a flourish stream of research literature (see [18] for an
exhaustive review). The first key element which comes into play in the decision process
is the Subjective Probability, which has been intensively studied since the preliminary
contributions by de Finetti [6]. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [29] initiated the work on
preferences over lotteries, which adimit a representation in terms of an expected utility.
This intuition dates back to a paper published in 1738 (see [3]), where Bernoulli already
realized that any decision is heavily linked to the “particular circumstances of the person
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making the estimate”, which could vary significantly depending on the observed evolution
of information. For example a fund manager may start behaving in a risk seeking manner
under the stress provoked by a plunge of the financial markets, which is causing severe
losses.
Debreu [5] gave an axiomatic setup (on a finite state space) to model preference relations
which can depend on the future state of nature and can be represented by the so-called
state-dependent utility functions (see Theorem B.3, in the Appendix). State dependent
preferences are sensitive to the random outcomes that may occur in the future and there-
fore the agent subjective utility may be affected by different future scenarios related to the
occurrence of specific events. Karni [15] developed measures of risk aversion which allows
the partial ordering of state dependend utilities in view of optimal risk sharing analysis.
In [30], Wakker and Zank provided an extension of Debreu’s result from finite to infinite
dimension, for the special case of real-valued outcomes and monotonic preferences. The
development of their extended functional, additively decomposable on infinite-dimensional
spaces, leads to a numerical representation of the preferences in terms of a state dependent
utility u and a probability P (see Theorem B.5, Appendix). The main results in [30] (and
[4]) will indeed play a key role in the proofs of the results contained in the present paper.
In [16] Kreps and Porteus gave rise to a new axiomatic treatment of the temporal resolu-
tion of uncertainty. They consider a discrete time model t = 0, . . . , T where an individual
must choose an action dt constrained to the state xt occurred at time t. As a random event
takes place determining an immediate payoff zt, the action dt will affect the probability
distribution of (zt, xt+1) where xt+1 is the new state of the world. The result is a dynamic
choice behaviour which cannot be represented by a single cardinal utility.
Epstein Zin [12] and Duffie Epstein [8] (see also [11]) constructed a class of recursive pref-
erences over intertemporal consumption lotteries respectively in discrete and continuous
time models. In [12] the recursive utility at time t is given by an aggregating function
i.e. Vt(c) =W (ct,mt(Vt+1)) where ct is the consuption and mt(Vt+1) the certainty equiv-
alent at time t of Vt+1. Similarly Duffie and Epstein [8] obtained a representation of the
recursive utility on consumption streams of the form
Vt(c) = EP
[∫ T
t
(
f(cs, Vs(c)) +
1
2
A(Vs(c))|σs|
2
)
ds
∣∣Ft
]
,
where f is an aggregator, A is the variance multiplier and σ is a volatility process. In such
context the system of conditional preferences between two consumptions is determined by
the recursive utility as follow:
c ω,t c
′ ⇐⇒ Vt(c, ω) ≥ Vt(c
′, ω).
In [9], Epstein and LeBreton showed that the existence of a Bayesian prior is implied by
preferences based on beliefs which admit a dynamically consistent updating in response to
2
new information. The effect of consequences by the mean of conditional preferences over
acts is introduced by Skiadas in [28]. Given an event F , the preference relation x F y
“has the interpretation that, ex ante, the decision maker regards the consequences of act
x on event F no less desirable than the consequences of act y on the same event ”([28] pp.
350). Wang [31] axiomatized three updating rules for a class of conditional preferences
over consumption-information profiles. A systematic study of conditional preferences is
provided in [7]: a conditional preference order is a binary relation  which is reflexive,
transitive and locally complete. An opportune extension to the conditional setup of the
indipendence and Archimedean axioms, led in [7, Theorem 5.2] to the representation of
conditional preferences over the set of lotteries in terms of a conditional utility function.
Recurvive multiple-priors and dynamic variational preferences (see resp. [10] and [17])
deals with conditional preference relations t,ω on consumption streams h. Here t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , T} is a point in time and ω is the path of the state space observed up to time
t. Recursive multiple-priors utility and dynamic variation preferences can be represented
respectively in the form of conditional functionals
Vt(h) = inf
P∈∆
(
EP
[∑
τ≥t
βτ−tu(hτ ) | Ft
])
(1.1)
Vt(h) = inf
P∈∆
(
EP
[∑
τ≥t
βτ−tu(hτ ) | Ft
]
+ ct(p|Ft)
)
, (1.2)
where ct is the recursive ambigity index, which under some restrictions gurantees time
consistency of the preferences (See [17, p.14, Axiom 4]). In both papers [10, 17] the Dy-
namic Consistency Axiom plays a fundamental role and inspired the result contained in
Proposition 3.8, Section 3 of the present paper.
Finally we observe that in the recent paper [25], Riedel et al. consider dynamic preferences
t,s on couples (P, f) where P belongs to a set of probabilities and f is an act (impre-
cise probabilistic framework). An important feature is that Dynamic Consistency of the
preferences guarantees that the set of conditional priors is stable under pasting.
From Economics to Finance: the dynamics of decision making. The interplay
between Decion Theory and Financial Mathematics had its outbreak after the important
contribution given by Merton in [19] and is witnessed by the flourish literature on stochas-
tic optimal control (see [23] for a detailed exposition).
The classical utility maximization problem can be formulated as a stochastic control prob-
lem of the form
v(t,X) = sup
α∈A(t,X)
EP[u(VT (t,X, α)) | Ft],
where the sup is to be intended as a P essential supremum, A(t,X) is the set of admissible
strategies (starting at time t), u is a concave utility function and VT (t,X, α) is the FT -
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measurable final payoff of the strategy α with initial random endowment X (which is
Ft-measurable). We may question when an agent, acting as a utility optimizer, is willing
to invest in a strategy α from time t to time T , provided she owns at t the random amount
X. The answer to this question is deeply related to the intertemporal comparison between
X and the final value of the strategy α given by VT (t,X, α). One rational solution could
be that the agent enters the dynamic investment only if she believes to hold an optimal
solution. Namely we can define an intertemporal relation t,T by
X t,T VT (t,X, α) if and only if v(t,X) ≥ EP[u(VT (t,X, α)) | Ft] P-a.s.. (1.3)
The Dynamic Programming Principle ([23, Theorem 3.3.1]) implies that for any bounded
random variable X, v(t,X) ≥ EP[u(VT (t,X, α))|Ft ] and equality holds whenever α
∗ is
the optimal policy. In this case X is the intertemporal equivalent of VT (t,X, α
∗) which
will be named in the following section of this paper Conditional Certainty Equivalent. In
this example, v represents the indirect utility and the preference relation t,T is not a
standard binary relation and its properties need to be introduced carefully as we shall do
in an abstract fashion in Section 3.
This classical backward approach to utility maximization has recently been argued in
a series of paper by Musiela and Zariphopoulou starting from [20, 21] and a novel forward
theory has been proposed: the utility function is stochastic, time dependent and moves
forwardly. In this theory, the forward performance (which replaces the indirect utility of
the classic case) is built through the underlying financial market and must satisfy some
appropriate martingale conditions. Inspired by this idea, Frittelli and Maggis [14] studied
the conditional (dynamic) version of certainty equivalent (as defined in [24]). The prelim-
inary object is a stochastic dynamic utility u(t, x, ω) - i.e. a stochastic field - representing
the evolution of the preferences of the agent. The novelty in [14] is that the (backward)
conditional certainty equivalent, represents the time-s-value of the time-t-claim X, for
0 ≤ s ≤ t < ∞, capturing in this way the intertemporal nature of preferences. Unfortu-
nately any axiomatization of intertemporal preferences, which could justify the represen-
tation in terms of stochastic dynamic utilities, is still missing in the literature and our aim
is to fill this gap.
The aim of this paper. Indeed people are highly impatient when comparing present
and future outcomes and both emotion-based and cognitive-based mechanisms contribute
to intertemporal distortions. In [32], Zauberman and Urminsky provide an overview of
the psychological determinants of intertemporal choice such as impulsivity, goal comple-
tion and reward timing, different evaluation of the future in terms of concreteness, time
perception and many other features:
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“In sum, these findings establish that the way people perceive future time itself is an
important factor in how they form their intertemporal preferences [...]
What is common across the various factors influencing intertemporal preferences is that
all these mechanisms influence the relative attractiveness of achieving a present goal
compared to a later more distant one. ”(see [32], p. 139)
In this paper we aim at characterizing a family of intertemporal preference relations
which compare random payoffs whose realizations will be known at different points in
time. We will introduce a set of conditional axioms which will lead to the representation of
preference in terms of a Stochastic Dynamic Utility u(t, x, ω) and a Subjective Probability
P on a general state space Ω (see Theorem 3.6), which can be rephrased as: conditional
to the available information, g is prefered at time s to f at time t if and only if
u(s, g) ≥ EP[u(t, f) | Fs] P− a.s.
The Stochastic Dynamic Utility turns out to be a random field adapted to a given filtration
which represents the information flow. For this reason u(t, x, ω) randomly reacts whenever
the Decision Maker becomes aware of new sensitive data, such as market behavior, news,
catastrophic shocks or any other macro/micro factor which leads to a reconsideration of
personal beliefs. Since different random payoffs are defined on different instants in time,
the notion of preference relation1 we are going to introduce will satisfy non-standard
axioms and will take the name of Intertemporal Preferences (ITP).
The main novelty of our approach is that we provide an abstract axiomatization of
Intertemporal Preferences which allows to include in our model “the relative attractiveness
of achieving a present goal compared to a later more distant one ”. Indeed our iterative
construction leads to an automatic forward updating of preferences depending on the
avaliable information, which satisfies a form of dynamic consinstency. As a byproduct we
obtain a theoretical framework where the theory of Forward Performances [1, 20, 21] and
the study of Conditional Certainty Equivalent [14] can be embedded.
The key ingredients of ITP can be summarized by four elements: first the information
at each time is described by the existence of a filtration {Ft}t∈[0,+∞), i.e. a family of sigma
algebras such that Fs ⊆ Ft for s ≤ t. Second, as ITP compares random payoffs which
live at different times, we shall need to introduce a relation s,t (resp. s,t) for s < t
being two points in time. In particular g s,t f will mean that the Ft-measurable payoff
f (which will be fully revealed at time t) is preferred to the Fs-measurable g, conditioned
to the knowledge of the information available at time s (Similar for g s,t f). Third the
1We point out that the use of the term ‘preference’is slightly improper as the ordering will not be a
binary relation as it is usually intended.
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preference relation s,t is not total if the full information Fs is not yet disclosed. The
notion of conditional preferences as introduced in [7] becomes therefore an important tool
to understand the nature of ITP. Finally we will assume that the agent observes real
information only through a discretisation of the time line, namely t0 = 0 < t1 < ... < tn <
. . .. We observe that in [7] a probability on the conditional sigma algebra was assumed to
exist a priori. In our approach this requirement is not necessary, but we rather derive step
by step a new probability update which follows directly from the decision theory structure
we are choosing.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide a description of the notations
used in the paper and a toy example to motivate our study; Section 3 is devoted to the
description of the set of axioms characterizing ITP and to the statement of the main
representation result. In Section 4 we prove the result in the unconditioned case (i.e. for
trivial initial information). The aim of Section 4 is twofold: on the one hand it will serve as
initial step of the induction argument we present in Section 5 to obtain the complete proof
of our main Theorem 3.6. On the other hand, it is written in a self-contained manner, so
that it can be read and understood independently from the general conditional setting.
2 Preliminaries on Intertemporal preferences.
2.1 Notations
Throughout the paper we shall make use of the notations described in this short section.
We fix a measure space (Ω,F) where Ω is the set of all possible events (state space)
and F is a sigma algebra. We shall model information over time by the existence of an
arbitrary filtration {Ft}t∈[0,+∞), with Fs ⊆ Ft ⊆ F for every s ≤ t. For any given sigma
algebra G ⊆ F we denote by L (G) the space of G-measurable functions taking values in
R (outcome space). We shall usually refer to elements f ∈ L (G) as random variables
(or acts) and denote by L∞(G) its subspace collecting bounded elements i.e. f ∈ L (G)
such that |f(ω)| ≤ k for any ω ∈ Ω and some k ≥ 0. On L (G) and L∞(G) we shall
consider the usual pointwise order f ≤ g if and only if f(ω) ≤ g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω
and similarly f < g if and only if f(ω) < g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. Given two elements
f, g ∈ L∞(G) we use the notation f ∨ g, f ∧ g to indicate respectively the minimum and
the maximum between f and g. For a countable family of acts {fn}n∈N ⊆ L
∞(G) we
consider the infn fn, supn fn the pointwise infimum/supremum of the family and recall that
if the family is uniformly bounded then infn fn, supn fn are elements of L
∞(G). L∞(G)
endowed with the sup norm ‖·‖∞ becomes a Banach lattice, where ‖f‖∞ = supω∈Ω |f(ω)|.
By 1A, A ∈ G we indicate the element of L
∞(G) such that 1A(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ A and 0
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otherwise. For f ∈ L∞(G) and A ∈ G, f1A denotes the restriction of f to A; for any
couple f, g ∈ L (G) and event A ∈ G, f1A+ g1Ac denotes the random variable that agrees
with f on A and with g on Ac. Let G1 ⊂ G2 be two sigma algebras. For a finite partition
{A1, ..., An} ⊂ G2 of Ω and {gj}
n
j=1 ⊂ L
∞(G1),
∑n
j=1 gj1Aj denotes the element assigning
gj on Aj, ∀j = 1, ..., n. This type of random variables can be interpreted as simple act
conditional to G1 and SG1(G2) denotes the space conditional simple acts. The standard
notion of simple acts can be obtained when G1 = {∅,Ω} and the corresponding space will
be denoted by S(G2).
Whenever a probability P is given (Ω,F ,P) becomes a measure space and as usual we
shall say that a probability P˜ is dominated by P (P˜ ≪ P) if P(A) = 0 implies P˜(A) = 0
for A ∈ F . Similarly a probability P˜ is equivalent to P (P˜ ∼ P) if P ≪ P˜ and P˜ ≪ P. A
property holds P almost surely (P-a.s.), if the set where it fails has 0 probability.
For any given sigma algebra G ⊆ F we shall denote with L0(Ω,G,P) the space of equiv-
alence classes of G measurable random variables that are P almost surely equal and by
L∞(Ω,G,P) the subspace of (P a.s.) bounded random variables. Formally any f ∈ L (G)
will be a representative of the class X := [f ]P ∈ L
0(Ω,G,P). Moreover the essential (P
a.s.) supremum of an arbitrary family of random variables {Xλ}λ∈Λ ⊆ L
0(Ω,G,P) will be
simply denoted by P− sup{Xλ | λ ∈ Λ}, and similarly for the essential infimum (see [13]
Section A.5 for reference).
Let us fix (Ω,G,P): given a random field φ : Ω × R → R such that for every f ∈ L∞(G)
the map ω 7→ φ(ω, f(ω)) is G-measurable (see [26] for further details) we introduce the
notation
L(G;φ) = {[φ(·, f(·))]P | f ∈ L
∞(G)}. (2.4)
Indeed L(G;φ) represents the range of the random field φ in the space L0(Ω,G,P). In
order to tackle the issue of continuty of the conditional representation of preferences, we
need to introduce an ad hoc definition of continuity for stochastic fields. Consider (Ω,G,P)
and φ : Ω×R→ R as for (2.4), we say that φ is ⋆-continuous if ∀f ∈ L∞(G) it holds that
f(ω) belongs to the points of continuity of φ(·, ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω (see Definition A.2 in
Appendix A for the formal statement).
Finally the space of P integrable random variables will be denoted by L1(Ω,G,P). We use
the standard notation and indicate by EP[X] the Lebesgue integral of X ∈ L
1(Ω,G,P).
Moreover if H is a sigma algebra contained in G then EP[X | H] denotes the conditional
expectation of X given H and P|H the restriction of the probability P on the smaller sigma
algebra H.
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2.2 State dependent utility and the role of information: a toy example
Two brothers E,Y are inheriting from their old and rich grandmother. The elder brother
E is asked to choose between receiving 1 million Euros immediately (at time t = 0), or
waiting two years (time t2) when his grandmother will move to the rest home in Sardinia
and earn her wonderful villa near the Como Lake. Alternatively E could wait until the
intermediate time t1 to make up his decision, but in any case the younger brother Y will
have to accept what is left from E after his decision is taken.
The value of the villa at time 0 is equal to 1 million, but of course it makes little sense to
compare the two values today since the villa will be available only at t2.
Now assume that at time t1 election for the new Italian Government will take place and
the catastrophic event of Italy leaving the European Union (with a consequent default of
its economic system) may occur. Call this event A and set Ft1 = {∅,Ω, A,A
c}. Brother
E knows that if Ac will occurs the value of the villa will increase to 1.11 · 106, but in case
of default it will fall down to 2 · 105. The probability of the default event A is low but
not negligible, say P(A) = 0.01. Finally the probability of defaulting at time t2 (call this
event D) knowing that Ac occurred is almost negligible, for instance P(D | Ac) = 10−6
(in which case the villa would be worth again 2 · 105). In case that a default did not
occur neither at time t1 nor at time t2 then the value of the villa at t2 would jump up to
1.8 · 106. Information at time t2 is therefore described by Ft2 the sigma algebra generated
by {A,D}.
Agent E is assumed to be risk neutral as far as Italy is not defaulting i.e. u(x) = x. In
case of a default (either at time t1 or t2) his utility function would be u˜(x) =
1
2x if x ≥ 0
or u˜(x) = 2x if x < 0 . The naive idea is that once the default has occurred the agent
gives more importance in avoiding losses, rather than gaining money. We can synthesize
this reasoning by introducing the stochastic dynamic utility as follows
u(t, x, ω) =


u(x) if t = 0
u˜(x)1A(ω) + u(x)1Ac(ω) if t = 1
u˜(x)1A∪D(ω) + u(x)1Ac∩Dc(ω) if t = 2
We make the following considerations.
• If agent E compares the choice between getting 106 today or the villa at time t2,
then he is comparing the utility u0(10
6) = 106 with respect to the expected utility
of the payoff at time t2 given by
Expected payoff = 1.8 · 106 · (1− 10−2 − 10−6) +
1
2
· 2 · 105 · (10−2 + 10−6).
This Expected payoff is strictly greater than 106 and indeed if E neglects the inter-
mediate time t1 then he will choose for the villa instead of immediate money. But
8
this impulsive strategy would not lead to an optimal solution.
• Assume now that the agent first compare 106 with the value of the villa at time t1.
Then
Expected payoff = 1.11 · 106 · 0.9 +
1
2
· 2 · 105 · 0.01 = 106.
This means that the expected value of the villa at time t1 is the same of the cash
amount of money which means that E is indifferent between taking the decision
today (t = 0) or tomorrow (t1). Therefore he has better waiting until the elections
take place and distinguish between event A or Ac. In the former case E will choose
106 which is in fact better than the value of the villa. In the second case he will
prefer obtaining the villa at time t2 rather than 10
6 at time t1. Clearly this second
strategy provides an optimal final profile, since it exploits the additional intermediate
information.
Remark 2.1. Notice that the reasoning would change if the elder brother reckons P(A) =
0. In such a case the additional intermediate information would play no role in the decision
process.
3 An axiomatization of intertemporal preferences.
We consider a time interval [0,+∞), together with a fixed (countable) family of updating
times t0 = 0 < t1 < . . . < tn < . . . ,. At each ti the agent shall reconsider her preference
relations depending on the observed information. In particular at time t0 = 0 no informa-
tion is available, i.e. F0 = {∅,Ω}. Information at each time t is represented by a sigma
algebra Ft and since information increases in time we shall have Fs ⊆ Ft for every s ≤ t.
In the entire paper acts are intended as real valued random variables, matching the frame-
work used in [30]2.
Assumption 3.1. We shall always assume throughout the paper that the agent is endowed
by some initial utility function u0 : R→ R which is strictly increasing and continuous (not
necessarily concave). For simplicity we will consider the case u0(0) = 0.
The paper could be developed without fixing u0 as in Assumption 3.1. The advantage
of this choice is twofold: on the one hand fixing a single u0 gives a sharper uniqueness
result in Theorem 3.6 (see also Remark 4.9). On the other hand u0 plays the role of
“initial value ”, which follows from the idea that u0 is inherited from the attitude towards
2Indeed this choice is not ‘without loss of generality’. Nevertheless as explained in the Introduction this
research is inspired by potential financial applications and therefore we prefer to choose a more financial
friendly setup.
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decisions shown by the agent in the past. The shape of u0 is effective: for instance it
allows to understand if at the initial time the agent is risk averse or risk seeking and in
general how she evaluates variation in the amount of money she owns (quoting [3] “Thus
there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to a pauper than
to a rich man though both gain the same amount.”).
The time t1 represents the first instant when the Decion Maker observes available
information which will potentially influence her decision. Random payoffs at time t1 are
described by random variables in L∞(Ft1) and the agent compares these random payoffs
with initial sure positions represented by elements in R. In Section 4 we shall provide the
representation of an intertemporal preference 0,1 connecting the initial time t0 = 0 to t1.
In Proposition 4.8 we will show the following: if 0,1 is complete, transitive, monotone,
continuous and satisfies the Sure-Thing Priciple then for any f ∈ L∞(Ft1) and a ∈ R we
have a 0,1 f is and only if u0(a) ≥
∫
Ω u1(f(ω), ω)dP1(ω). This representation is based
on Theorem B.5 by Wakker and Zank and shows how new inputs will affect the attitude
of an agent towards decisions, generating a new utility u1 which will depend on the state
of nature realized. Once time t1 is reached the Decison Maker will start considering a
new aim in the next future, say t2, and compare random payoffs, known at time t1, with
those which will depend on events occurring at t2. From the t0 perspective the new
intertemporal preference 1,2 will be a conditional preference relation which incorporates
the further knowledge reached at time t1. Therefore we shall follow the idea proposed by
[7] and make use of similar techniques developed in the conditional setting. This procedure
will repeat iteratively at every interval from ti to ti+1 and for this reason our main result
will be proved by induction over updating times. Each updating step from ti to ti+1 will
be characterized by a preference interconnection i,i+1 (or i,i+1) satisfying conditional
transition axioms. Of course since the proof proceeds by induction we will assume that
we reached the desired representation up to step ti and show the representation at the
succeeding time ti+1. This will guarantee the existence of a probability Pi only on the
sigma algebra Fti , which we will need to update to the larger sigma algebra Fti+1 , following
the Bayesian paradigm.
For the statement of Theorem 3.6, we fix an arbitrary N and a family of intertemporal
preference relations i,i+1 for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 with the following meaning: for any g ∈
L∞(Fti) and f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1) we say that g i,i+1 f if the agent prefers to hold the gamble
g at time ti than the gamble f at time ti+1, knowing all the information provided at time
ti (similarly for g i,i+1 f).
As usual we say that g ∈ L∞(Fti) is equivalent to f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1), namely g ∼i,i+1 f , if
both g i,i+1 f and g i,i+1 f , and define the family of null events for every i = 1, . . . , N
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as
N (Fti) = {A ∈ Fti : g ∼i−1,i f ⇒ g ∼i−1,i g˜1A+f1Ac,∀f,∈ L
∞(Fti), g, g˜ ∈ L
∞(Fti−1)}.
(3.5)
An event A ∈ Fti is called essential at time ti if A ∈ Fti \ N (Fti)
The Transition Axiom. We are now ready to introduce the first axiom characteriz-
ing the Intertemporal Preferences. In this context the preference ordering i,i+1 is not
anymore a binary relation as it is generally understood. For this reason we shall need a
reformulation of the axioms which shall be compared to more classical ones. Moreover
we work in a conditional setting, which means that the relation i,i+1 is assessed taking
into account information available at time ti. Information are modelled by measurable
sets A ∈ Fti and in addition the Decision Maker has a subjective belief concerning sets
which are relevant (A ∈ Fti \ N (Fti)) and those which are irrelevant (A ∈ N (Fti)). To
understand the central role of null sets we refer to the example contained in Section 2.2
(see in particular Remark 2.1).
(T.i) Transition Axiom for the couple i,i+1, i,i+1. Let A,B ∈ Fti , g ∈ L
∞(Fti) and
f ∈ L∞(Fti+1) then we require for i,i+1, i,i+1 to be
1. locally complete: there exists A ∈ Fti \N (Fti) such that either g1A i,i+1 f1A
or g1A i,i+1 f1A.
2. transitive: if g i,i+1 f and h i,i+1 f then {g < h} ∈ N (Fti);
3. normalized: if A,B ∈ N (Fti) then 1A ∼i,i+1 1B .
4. non-degenerate: for any f ∈ L∞(Fti+1) there exist g1, g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that
g1 i,i+1 f and g2 i,i+1 f .
5. consistent: if g1A i,i+1 f1A (resp. i,i+1) and B ⊆ A then g1B i,i+1 f1B
(resp. i,i+1);
6. stable: if g1A i,i+1 f1A (resp. i,i+1) and g1B i,i+1 f1B (resp. i,i+1) then
g1A∪B i,i+1 f1A∪B (resp. i,i+1);
Before giving an explanation of (T.i) in its full generality, we specialize it to the uncondi-
tioned case (i = 0).
(T.0) Transition preference relation 0,1.
1. complete: for a ∈ R and f ∈ L∞(Ft1) either a 0,1 f or a 0,1 f ;
2. transitive: a 0,1 f and b 0,1 f implies a ≤ b;
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3. normalized: 0 ∼0,1 0 (i.e. 0 0,1 0 and 0 0,1 0).
4. non-degenerate: for any f ∈ L∞(Ft1) there exist y, z ∈ R such that y 0,1 f
and x 0,1 f .
The Axiom (T.0) is composed by four requirements only and the reason of this signifi-
cant simplification is due to the assumption F0 = {∅,Ω}. To understand why completeness
and transitivity are the natural counterpart suggested by the classical definition of weak
order, we observe that Proposition 4.5 guarantees that under (T.0) for any f ∈ L∞(Ft1)
there exists a unique C0,1(f) ∈ R such that both C0,1(f) 0,1 f or C0,1(f) 0,1 f hold.
We can therefore consider the following induced ordering 1: for any f, g ∈ L
∞(Ft1),
f 1 g if and only if C0,1(f) ≤ C0,1(g). Indeed 1 is reflexive and inherits completeness
and transitivity from 0,1.
We now move to the interpretation of Axiom (T.i): properties 1, 5 and 6 are deeply re-
lated and inspired to the notion of conditional preference in [7]. The first property of (T.i)
points out that the updating procedure necessarily leads to preferences which are complete
in a conditional sense. In particular we shall see in Lemma 5.3 (which is the counterpart of
Lemma 3.2 in [7]) that local completeness allows to compare two acts on three disjoint Fti
measurable events. Consistency and stability can be understood in terms of information
achieved: for example consistency states that if the agent prefer g ∈ L∞(Fti) at time ti
rather than f ∈ L∞(Fti+1) at time ti+1 knowing that event A ∈ Fti has occurred, than
she shall prefer g for any condition B ∈ Fti , B ⊆ A.
The property 2 in (T.i) is the conditional generalization of its counterpart in (T.0). Nor-
malization (property 3) says that Fti null events are preserved in the one step updating.
In particular the agent is indifferent between random payoffs which differ from 0 by a
negligible Fti measurable set (Loosely speaking “Holding nothing is indifferent through-
out time”, up to null events). Non degeneracy (property 4) is the more technical one and
guarantees some simplifications in our arguments, since it implies that any random payoff
f at time ti+1 admits an Fti-measurable g which is more/less preferred (it is nevertheless
a very weak requirement which is satisfied in all the cases of interest).
Example 3.2. In the Introduction (pp. 3-4) we proposed the classical framework of utility
maximization, which can help understanding the meaning of Axiom (T.i) 1,5,6. In fact the
preference relation X t,T VT (t,X, α) is defined via the inequality between Ft-measurable
random variables, v(t,X) ≥ EP[u(VT (t,X, α)) | Ft], and inherits those properties which
characterize the conditional expectation (namely Axiom (T.i) 1,5,6, replacing ti with t and
ti+1 with T ).
The definition of Conditional Certainty Equivalent is the basis of our representation
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results and follows from the idea in [14]. In Section 5 we shall show by induction the
existence (and uniqueness) of the Conditional Certainty Equivalent at each time step.
Definition 3.3. We say g ∼i,i+1 f if and only if g i,i+1 f and g i,i+1 f . If g ∼i,i+1 f
then we shall call g the Conditional Certainty Equivalent (CCE) of f and denote the family
of all CCEs as Ci,i+1(f).
Notation 3.4. In what follows we shall use these notations for any g ∈ L∞(Fti) and
f ∈ L∞(Fti+1):
• g ∼i,i+1 f if both g i,i+1 f and g i,i+1 f hold;
• g ≻i,i+1 f if g i,i+1 f but g1A 6∼i,i+1 f1A ∀A ∈ Fti \ N (Fti);
• g ≺i,i+1 f if g i,i+1 f but g1A 6∼i,i+1 f1A ∀A ∈ Fti \ N (Fti);
• g ≻Ai,i+1 f if g1A i,i+1 f1A but g1B 6∼i,i+1 f1B ∀B ∈ Fti \ N (Fti) with B ⊆ A;
• g ≺Ai,i+1 f if g1A i,i+1 f1A but g1B 6∼i,i+1 f1B ∀B ∈ Fti \ N (Fti) with B ⊆ A.
Remark 3.5. We observe that consistency jointly to stability of i,i+1 (similar for i,i+1)
imply the following pasting properties:
• for any A,B ∈ Fti , g1, g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) and f1, f2 ∈ L
∞(Fti+1). If g11A i,i+1 f11A
and g21B i,i+1 f21B then (g1+g2)1A∩B i,i+1 (f1+f2)1A∩B , g11A\B i,i+1 f11A\B
and g21B\A i,i+1 f21B\A.
• for a family {An}n∈N ⊆ Fti of disjoint events and A = ∪nAn we have
g1A i,i+1 f1A ⇔ g1An i,i+1 f1An for every n.
Axiom (T.i) is the key ingredient to obtain the updating construction we are aiming at.
In particular assume that at time ti the agent is characterized by a couple (Pi, ui) where
Pi is the subjective probability on measurable events Fti and ui is a state dependent
utility such that ui(x, ·) is Fti-measurable. We shall prove in Proposition 5.1 that if i,i+1
satisfies (T.i) then for any f ∈ L∞(Fti+1) there exists a unique Conditional Certainty
Equivalent given by Ci,i+1(f) = u
−1
i Vi+1(f), where Vi+1(f) = Pi − inf{ui(g) | g i,i+1 f}.
Moreover Vi+1 represents the transition order i.e.
g i,i+1 f ⇔ ui(g) ≤ Vi+1(f) Pi-a.s.
g i,i+1 f ⇔ ui(g) ≥ Vi+1(f) Pi-a.s.
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Integral representation of Inter Temporal Preferences. We will take into con-
sideration the following axioms: monotonicity, the Sure Thing Principle and a technical
continuity, adapted to this conditional setting, which will lead to a representation of the
ITP in the desired integral form.
(M.i) Strict Monotonicity. Given arbitrary g1, g2, g3,∈ L
∞(Fti), f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1), A ∈
Fti+1 \ N (Fti+1) and g1 < g2:
g3 ∼i,i+1 g11A + f1Ac implies g3 ≺
B
i,i+1 g21A + f1Ac for some B ∈ Fti \ N (Fti),
g3 ∼i,i+1 g21A + f1Ac implies g3 ≻
B
i,i+1 g11A + f1Ac for some B ∈ Fti \ N (Fti).
(ST.i) Sure-Thing Principle. Given arbitrary f1, f2, h ∈ SFti (Fti+1), A ∈ Fti+1 \N (Fti+1)
and g1 ∈ L
∞(Fti), such that g1 i,i+1 f11A + h1Ac and g1 i,i+1 f21A + h1Ac : for
any k ∈ SFti (Fti+1) there exists g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that g2 i,i+1 f11A + k1Ac and
g2 i,i+1 f21A + k1Ac .
(C.i) Pointwise continuity. Consider any uniformly bounded sequence {fn} ⊆ L
∞(Fti+1),
such that fn(ω) → f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω, then for any g ≺i,i+1 f (resp. g ≻i,i+1 f )
there exists a partition {Ak}
∞
k=1 ⊂ Fti such that for any k we have g1Ak i,i+1 fn1Ak
(resp. g1Ak i,i+1 fn1Ak ) for all n ≥ nk.
We are now ready to state the main contribution of this paper: Theorem 3.6 provides
the representation of ITP in terms of a unique probability P and a stochastic field u(t, x, ω),
which describes the random fluctuations of preferences. These were exactly the elements
exploited in [14] to determine the dynamics of the Conditional Certainty Equivalent.
Theorem 3.6 (Representation). Let Assumption 3.1 holds and any Fti contains three
essential disjoint events for every i = 1, 2, . . . . The intertemporal preference i,i+1 satisfies
(T.i), (M.i), (ST.i) and (C.i) for any i = 0, . . . , N if and only if there exist a probability
P on FtN and a Stochastic Dynamic Utility
u(t, x, ω) =
N−1∑
i=0
ui(x, ω)1[ti,ti+1)(t) + uN (x, ω)1tN (t) (3.6)
satisfying
(a) u(ti, x, ·) is Fti-measurable and EP[|u(ti, x, ·)|] <∞, for all x ∈ R;
(b) u(ti, ·, ω) is strictly increasing in x and u(ti, 0, ω) = 0
3, for all ω ∈ Ω;
3This additional requirement is in fact without loss of generality, and allows a useful simplification in
the main body of the proof.
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(c) u(ti, ·, ·) is ⋆-continuous
(d) EP[ui+1(f)|Fti ] ∈ L(Fti ;ui)
4 for any f ∈ L∞(Fti+1), g ∈ L
∞(Fti) and
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ u(ti, g) ≥ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P-a.s.
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ u(ti, g) ≤ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P-a.s.
Relative uniqueness: the couple (P, u) can be replaced by (P∗, u∗) if and only if P is equiv-
alent to P∗ on FtN and for any i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u
∗(ti, ·, ·) = δiui) = 1, where δi is
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P|Fti with respect to P
∗
|Fti
.
Example 3.7 (Forward performances). Comparing the representation of ITP provided
in Theorem 3.6 with the existing literature about forward performances (see for instance
[1, 20, 21]), we may immediately notice that our approach does not rely on the existence
of a financial market. We recall that an adapted process U(x, t) on a fixed probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P) is said to be a Forward Performance if: i) it is increasing and
concave as a function of x for each t; ii) U(x, 0) = u0(x) ∈ R; iii) for all T ≥ t and
each self-financing strategy represented by π, the associated discounted wealth Xpi satisfies
EP[U(X
pi
T , T ) | Ft] ≤ U(X
pi
t , t); iv) for all T ≥ t there exists a self-financing strategy π
∗
such that Xpi
∗
satisfies the equality in point iii).
A posteriori we therefore know that the couple (P, U(t, x)) defines an intertemporal relation
s,t as usual by U(s, ·) ≥ EP[U(t, ·)|Fs] P-a.s.. In partiular for the optimal policy we have
the relation Xpi
∗
s ∼s,t X
pi∗
t
5. On the other hand not all the intertemporal preferences are
necessarily related to an existing financial market.
On the discount factor. The role of discounting in the theory of dynamic choices can
be described on two different layers.
First layer: in equations (1.1), (1.2) we see an explicit dependence on a discount factor
related to the utility u, which is motivated by the fact that u is homogeneous in time.
Indeed in our framework u(t, x, ω) varies stochastically in time and therefore it is not
possible to disentagle the contribution of discounting from the utility in a unique way.
Moreover the uniqueness of the representation is up to equivalent change of measures
and therefore the discount factor would be in any case sensitive to probabilistic measure
changes. Nevertheless there are situations in which it is possible to determine a discounting
process. For instance assume the Decion Maker finds a couple P, u which represents the
ITP as in Theorem 3.6, (d). At the same time the Decion Maker may be endowed by a
subjective probability P∗ and decide to perform a change of measure without changing
4See the definition in Equation (2.4)
5This can be compared with the discussion in the Introduction, see Equation (1.3).
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the Stochastic Dynamic Utility u. In such a situation the adapted process {βt}t≥0 defined
by βt = EP[
dP
dP∗ |Ft] can be interpreted as a stochastic discount factor: indeed for g ∈
L∞(Ω,Fti), f ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fti+1)
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ βtiu(ti, g) ≥ EP∗ [βti+1u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P
∗-a.s.
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ βtiu(ti, g) ≤ EP∗ [βti+1u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P
∗-a.s.
Second layer: in the theory of Forward Performances [20, 21], the representation of ITP
does not show any explicit dependence on a (stochastic) discount factor, but the utility U
is computed directly on discounted wealth processes assuming that a reference numeraire
exists a priori. Let {Bt}t∈[0,+∞) be an adapted stochastic process acting as a numeraire,
with P(Bt > ε) = 1 for some ε > 0. If P, u represent the ITP then we can set u∗(t, x, ω) :=
u(t, x ·Bt(ω), ω) and obtain
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ u
∗(ti, g
∗) ≥ EP[u
∗(ti+1, f
∗)|Fti ] P-a.s.
g i,i+1 f ⇐⇒ u
∗(ti, g
∗) ≤ EP[u
∗(ti+1, f
∗)|Fti ] P-a.s.
where g∗ = g
Bti
and f∗ = f
Bti+1
are the discounted values of g and f .
Time consistency of intertemporal preferences. The family {i,i+1} of intertem-
poral preferences is meant to create a link between two successive times ti and ti+1 in
order to compare random payoffs whose effects will be known and exploitable at different
times. The procedure is a step by step updating and simple inspections show that the
following semigroup property holds true for the Conditional Certainty Equivalent
Cs,v(f) = Cs,t(Ct,v(f))
6 ∀ 0 ≤ s < t < v and f ∈ L∞(Ω,Fv) (3.7)
where for any s < t the operator Cs,t(·) is the (P-a.s. unique) solution of the equation
u(s, Cs,t(·)) = EP[u(t, ·) | Fs] and u is the Stochastic Dynamic Utility obtained in Theorem
3.6. As an immediate consequence we can extend the intertemporal preferences to any
s < t as follows
g s,t f ⇐⇒ u(s, g) ≥ EP[u(t, f)|Fs] P-a.s.
g s,t f ⇐⇒ u(s, g) ≤ EP[u(t, f)|Fs] P-a.s.
where g ∈ L∞(Ω,Fs) and f ∈ L
∞(Ω,Ft). In virtue of the semigroup property (3.7) we
obtain the following time consistency of preferences
6Abuse of notation: the precise formulation should be Cs,v(f) = Cs,t(g) where g ∈ L (Ft) is a version
of Ct,v(f).
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Proposition 3.8. Let 0 ≤ s < t < v and let g ∈ L∞(Ω,Fs) and f ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fv) such
that g s,v f (resp. g s,v f). Then g s,t h (resp. g s,t h) for any h ∈ L
∞(Ω,Ft) such
that h ∼t,v f .
Since the proof of Theorem 3.6 will proceed inductively we choose to present the theory
in the simpler unconditioned case 0,1 (see Section 4). The results in the next section will
be therefore necessary to prove the initial step in the induction argument of Theorem 3.6.
Moreover we stress that the relative uniqueness is sharper than in representation results
like those contained in [4, 30]. This follows from the fact that the u0 is fixed a priori
(together with the normalization condition u(ti, 0, ω) = 0) and plays the role of an initial
(constraining) condition (see also Proposition 4.8 for further details).
4 Unconditioned intertemporal preference
We consider a Decision Maker who compares an initial amount of some good, whose value
is surely determined (and its benefit is immediate) with respect to bounded random payoffs
(e.g. bets, assets, future value of goods) at a fixed time t1 represented by elements in the
space L∞(Ft1). We say that the agent is initially naive, as the initial information are
represented by the trivial F0 = {∅,Ω} and therefore the space L
∞(F0) is isometric to the
real line R.
Consider the transition preference 0,1 (or 0,1) which connects L
∞(Ft1) to L
∞(F0).
As already observed in the case i = 0 the first Axiom (T.0) is composed only by four
requirements: completeness, transitivity, normalization and non degeneracy (which is the
more technical requirement we shall use in Lemma 4.3).
Remark 4.1. From Notation 3.4 we can easily deduce the meaning of the symbols ∼0,1,
≻0,1, ≺0,1. We also recall that the set of null events induced by 0,1 is given by
N (Ft1) = {A ∈ Ft1 : a ∼0,1 f ⇒ a ∼0,1 b1A + f1Ac ,∀f ∈ L
∞(Ft1), a, b ∈ R}.
Definition 4.2. If a ∼0,1 f then we shall call a the (Conditional) Certainty Equivalent
of f and denote the family of all CCEs as C0,1(f).
We now show that under (T.0) the CCE exists and is unique. Notice that this notion
of certainty equivalent matches the dynamic generalization introduced by [14]. The CCE
will also provide a natural representation of the intertemporal preference 0,1 (see the
following Proposition 4.5).
Consider the maps
V −1 (f) = sup{u0(a) | a 0,1 f} and V
+
1 (f) = inf{u0(a) | a 0,1 f},
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where u0 will be always supposed to fullfill Assumption 3.1.
We note that in the definition of V ±1 (f), u0 needs not to be fixed. Indeed if we consider
the total ordering on L∞(Ft1) induced by the functionals V
±
1 (·) (i.e. f1 1 f2 if and only
if V ±1 (f1) ≤ V
±
1 (f2)) this would not be affected by the choice of u0. Nevertheless as
previously explained we prefer to think u0 as an initial data characterizing the decision
maker, with the advantage of obtaining a sharper notion of uniqueness.
Lemma 4.3. Under (T.0) and Assumption 3.1 the maps V +1 , V
−
1 are well defined from
L∞(Ft1) to R. Moreover V
+
1 (f) = V
−
1 (f) for any f ∈ L
∞(Ft1).
Proof. From completeness V ±1 are well defined and taking values in R ∪ {±∞}. The fact
that V ±1 (f) are finite for any f ∈ L
∞(Ft1) follows from non degeneracy in Axiom (T.0).
For any a, b ∈ R such that a 0,1 f and b 0,1 f we have u0(a) ≤ u0(b) and therefore
V −1 (f) ≤ V
+
1 (f). Now assume by contradiction V
−
1 (f) < V
+
1 (f): since u0 is strictly
increasing and continuous there exists c such that u0(c) ∈ (V
−
1 (f), V
+
1 (f)). From com-
pleteness either c 0,1 f or c 0,1 f getting in both cases a contradiction since
sup{u0(a) | a 0,1 f} < u0(c) < inf{u0(a) | a 0,1 f}.
Notation 4.4. From now on, whenever (T.0) and Assumption 3.1 are in force we shall
denote V1 := V
+
1 ≡ V
−
1 .
Proposition 4.5. Let (T.0) and Assumption 3.1 hold. Then for any f ∈ L∞(Ft1) there
exists a unique Conditional Certainty Equivalent given by C0,1(f) = u
−1
0 V1(f). Moreover
V1 takes values in the range of u0 and represents the transition order i.e.
a 0,1 f ⇔ u0(a) ≤ V1(f) (4.8)
a 0,1 f ⇔ u0(a) ≥ V1(f) (4.9)
Proof. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 4.3 and Assumption
3.1. Notice that a 0,1 f (resp. a 0,1 f) obviously implies u0(a) ≤ V1(f) (resp. u0(a) ≥
V1(f)). For the reverse implication we can observe that u0(a) = V1(f) implies a ∼0,1 f .
If instead u0(a) < V1(f) (resp. u0(a) > V1(f)), then necessary a ≺0,1 f (resp. a ≻0,1 f)
as V1(f) = inf{u0(a) | a 0,1 f} (resp. V1(f) = sup{u0(a) | a 0,1 f}).
We will take into consideration the following axioms: monotonicity, the Sure Thing
Principle and a technical continuity, which we recall here to clarify their meaning in this
simplified unconditioned case.
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(M.0) Strict Monotonicity: for all a, b, c ∈ R, f ∈ L∞(Ft1) A ∈ Ft1 \ N (Ft1) and a < b
we have c ∼0,1 a1A+f1Ac implies c ≺0,1 b1A+f1Ac (resp. c ∼0,1 b1A+f1Ac implies
c ≻0,1 a1A + f1Ac).
(ST.0) Sure-Thing Principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ S(Ft1), A ∈ Ft1 \ N (Ft1) and
a ∈ R such that a 0,1 f1A + h1Ac and a 0,1 g1A + h1Ac then for any k ∈ S(Ft1)
there exists b ∈ R such that b 0,1 f1A + k1Ac and b 0,1 g1A + k1Ac .
(C.0) Pointwise continuity: consider any uniformly bounded sequence {fn} ⊆ L
∞(Ft1),
such that fn(ω) → f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω, then for all a ≺0,1 f (resp. a ≻0,1 f ) there
exists N such that a 0,1 fn (resp. a 0,1 fn ) for n > N .
Remark 4.6. In the classical Decision Theory (see [22]) the Sure-Thing Principle is a
sort of independence principle: it says that the preference between two acts, f and g, should
only depend on the values of f and g when they differ. If f and g differ only on an event
A, if A does not occur f and g result in the same outcome exactly. In our intertemporal
framework the interpretation is exactly the same, even though we need to deal with the
comparison at time 0.
Remark 4.7. In the present context the Sure-Thing Principle (ST.0) easily implies for
arbitrary f, g ∈ L∞(Ft1) and A ∈ Ft1 : V1(f1A) ≤ V1(g1A) and V1(f1Ac) ≤ V1(g1Ac)
then V1(f) ≤ V1(g).
In the remaining of this section we shall prove the following
Proposition 4.8. Assume that Ft1 contains at least three disjoint essential events and
Assumption 3.1 is in force. Axioms (T.0), (M.0), (ST.0) and (C.0) hold if and only if
there exists a probability P1 on Ω and a function u1(·, ω) : R → R, strictly increasing
∀ω ∈ Ω and ⋆-continuous such that the functional V1
V1(f) =
∫
Ω
u1(f(ω), ω)dP1 (4.10)
represents the preference 40,1 (in the sense of (4.8) and (4.9)) and takes values in the
range of u0.
The following uniqueness holds for (4.10) : (P1, u1) can be replaced by (P∗, u∗) if and
only if P1 is equivalent to P∗ and P1 (u∗ = δu1 + τ) = 1, where δ is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of P1 with respect to P∗ and τ ∈ L (Ft1) with EP∗[τ ] = 0.
Remark 4.9. Even though Proposition 4.8 shows many similarities with Theorem B.5,
some work needs to be done to show that Axioms (T.0), (M.0), (ST.0) and (C.0) are
sufficient to apply the results in [4, 30]. Moreover as V1 is defined via a fixed u0, we shall
show that the coefficient σ > 0 appearing in Theorem B.5 is necessarily equal to 1.
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Remark 4.10. We observe that even if not mentioned explicitly, necessarily the random
variable u1(x, ·) is integrable with respect to P1 for any x ∈ R.
Moreover if we impose the normalization requirement u1(0, ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ Ω then τ
is equal to 0 P-a.s..
4.1 Proof of Proposition 4.8
Observe that the hypothesis of Proposition 4.5 are satisfied. Hence, the representation
a <0,1 f ⇐⇒ u0(a) ≥ V1(f) holds where V1 is defined as in Lemma 4.3. Furthermore,
for any f ∈ L∞(Ft1) the CCE C0,1(f) exists and is uniquely given by u
−1
0 (V1(f)). The
existence of the CCE for every act f directly implies that the range of the function V1 is
contained in the range of u0.
Proof of (⇒) We define a weak order on L∞(Ft1) as f  g if and only if V1(f) ≤ V1(g).
(T.0) implies  is complete, reflexive and transitive (i.e. satisfies (A1) in the Appendix).
Let f ∈ L∞(Ft1) and outcomes x > y: indeed (M.0) implies V1(x1A+ f1Ac) > V1(y1A +
f1Ac), for all nonnull events A ∈ Ft1 and hence  is strictly monotone in the sense of
(A2). Similarly (ST.0) implies that  satisfies (A3).
Let now {fn} ⊆ L
∞(Ft1), such that fn(ω) → f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω and ‖fn‖∞ < k for all
n ∈ N. Let now g ∈ L∞(Ft1) such that g ≻ f and consider a = C0,1(g) (which exists by
Proposition 4.5). Then a ≻0,1 f and by (C.0) we can find n¯ such that for all n ≥ n¯ we
have a ≻0,1 fn. Therefore V1(g) = u0(a) > V1(fn) (similarly for the opposite inequality)
showing that (A4) holds for  .
We can therefore apply Theorem B.5 and find the desired representation (4.10) namely
V1(f) =
∫
Ω u1(f(ω), ω)dP1 = EP1 [u1(f)] and its uniqueness. Let therefore P
∗ and u∗(·, ·) =
τ+σδu1(·, ·) obtained by Theorem B.5. Observe that V1(0) = u0(0) = 0 implies EP∗ [τ ] = 0.
Moreover as u0(C0,1(f)) = V1(f) = EP∗ [u
∗(f)] = EP1 [σu1(f)], we have necessarily σ = 1.
We now show that the state dependent utility u1 is ⋆-continuous on (Ω,Ft1 ,P1).
To this end consider any f ∈ L∞(Ft1). It is sufficient to show that P1(LDf ) = 0 where
LDf is the set defined in Appendix A replacing φ with u1. Indeed, with an analogous
argument one obtains P1(RDf ) = 0. Ultimately, the thesis follows from the observation
that P1(Df ) = P1(LDf ∪RDf ) = 0 and the arbitrariness of f .
As consequence of Lemma A.1, LDf ∈ Ft1 , hence either P1(LDf ) = 0 or P1(LDf ) > 0.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists f∗ ∈ L∞(Ft1) such that P1(LDf∗) > 0. Set
B := LDf∗ and let f = f
∗1B and fn = (f −
1
n
)1B . By construction f, fn ∈ L
∞(Ft1) for
each n ∈ N, fn(ω)→ f(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω and supn ‖fn‖∞ ≤ ‖f‖∞ + 1. Furthermore, by
the definition of B, u1(f(ω), ω) > supn u1(fn(ω), ω) for each ω ∈ B while u1(f(ω), ω) =
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u1(fn(ω), ω) for each ω ∈ B
C . Since P1(B) > 0 and x 7→ u1(x, ω) is increasing, by
Monotone Convergence Theorem we have:
lim
n
EP1 [u1(fn, ·)] = EP1 [sup
n
u1(fn, ·)] < EP1 [u1(f, ·)]
By continuity and strict monotonicity of u0, there exists a ∈ R such that
sup
n
EP1 [u1(fn, ·)] < u0(a) < EP1 [u1(f, ·)]
that is a ≻0,1 fn ∀n while a ≺0,1 f . This contradicts Axiom (C.0), hence we conclude that
P1(B) equals zero.
Proof of (⇐) Viceversa, we assume that the preference <0,1 is given by:
a <0,1 f ⇐⇒ u0(a) ≥ V1(f)
for a ∈ R, f ∈ L∞(Ft1), with V1(f) = EP1 [u1(f, ·)], where u1 and P1 are given as in
Proposition 4.8. We want to show that that <0,1 satisfies Axioms (T.0), (M.0), (ST.0)
and (C.0).
Let a ∈ R and f ∈ L∞(Ft1). Clearly either u0(a) ≤ V1(f) or u0(a) ≥ V1(f) hence <0,1
is complete. Consider a, b ∈ R and f ∈ L∞(Ft1) satisfying a 40,1 f and b <0,1 f . This
means that u0(a) ≤ V1(f) ≤ u0(b). From the fact that u0 is strictly increasing it follows
that b ≥ a, that is that <0,1 is transitive. Clearly 0 ∼0,1 0 since u0(0) = 0 = EP1 [u1(0, ·)].
Finally, let f ∈ L∞(Ft1). By assumption the range of V1 is contained in the range of u0
so that there exists b ∈ R such that u0(b) ≥ V1(f) and (equivalently) b <0,1 f . For the
same reason there exists a ∈ R such that u0(a) ≤ V1(f), that is a 40,1 f . This means that
<0,1 is non-degenerate concluding the proof that Axiom (T.0) holds.
Let a, b, c ∈ R with a < b, f ∈ L∞(Ft1) and A ∈ Ft1 being non-null. Suppose that
c ∼0,1 a1A+f1AC , that is u0(c) = EP1 [u1(a1A+f1AC , ·)] = EP1 [u1(a, ·)1A+u1(f, ·)1AC )].
Now, since u1(·, ω) is strictly increasing for each ω, then EP1 [u1(a, ·)1A] < EP1 [u1(b, ·)1A].
Then u0(c) < EP1 [u1(b, ·)1A + u1(f, ·)1AC )] = EP1 [u1(b1A + f1AC , ·)] which means c ≺0,1
b1A + f1AC . The same argument can be used for c ∼0,1 b1A + f1AC leading to c ≻0,1
a1A + f1AC . Thus, <0,1 satisfies (M.0).
(ST.0) follows from the simple fact that EP1 [u1(f1A+h1Ac , ·)] ≤ EP1 [u1(g1A+h1Ac , ·)]
if and only if EP1 [u1(f1A + k1Ac , ·)] ≤ EP1 [u1(g1A + k1Ac , ·)] whatever the choice of
A ∈ Ft1 \ N (Ft1) and f, g, h, k ∈ L (Ft1).
Finally, let (fn)n∈N ⊆ L
∞(Ft1) be uniformly bounded and converging pointwise to f
for each ω ∈ Ω. Let K := supn ‖fn‖∞ ∈ R
+. Since the integral representation is pointwise
continuous (on uniformly bounded sequences) we have:
EP1 [u1(fn, ·)]→ EP1 [u1(f, ·)] (4.11)
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Now let a ∈ R such that a ≺0,1 f and call ε := EP1 [u1(f, ·)] − u0(a) > 0. Then by
(4.11) there exists N ∈ N such that |EP1 [u1(f, ·)] − EP1 [u1(fn, ·)]| < ε ∀n > N . The
triangular inequality implies that u0(a) < EP1 [u1(fn, ·)] ∀n > N , that is a ≺0,1 fn. The
same argument applies to a ≻0,1 f . Hence, (C.0) holds, concluding the proof.
5 Inductive proof of Theorem 3.6
This section is entirely devoted to the proof of the main Theorem of this paper.
On the direct implication (⇒). We shall proceed by induction. In fact if N = 1
Theorem 3.6 reduces to Proposition 4.8, which is proved in the previous Section 4.
Assumption 5.1. [Induction] We assume that the statement is true up to i. In particular
it means that we can guarantee the existence of a probability Pi on Fti and state-dependent
utilities {uk}
i
k=1, where uk(x, ·) is Ftk -measurable, integrable, strictly increasing in x, ⋆-
continuous, uk(0, ·) = 0 and
g k−1,k f ⇐⇒ uk−1(g) ≥ EPi [uk(f)|Ftk−1 ] Pi-a.s.
g k−1,k f ⇐⇒ uk−1(g) ≤ EPi [uk(f)|Ftk−1 ] Pi-a.s.
for any k = 1, . . . , i, f ∈ L∞(Ω,Ftk−1), g ∈ L
∞(Ω,Ftk ).
Under this assumption we shall now prove that the representation can be forwardly up-
dated to time ti+1.
Remark 5.2. We point out that N (Fti) = {A | ∃B ∈ Fti , Pi(B) = 0 and A ⊆ B}, where
N (Fti) are the null sets induced by the relations i−1,i, i−1,i as in (3.5).
Although a conditional preference is not total, the following lemma, which is inspired
by Lemma 3.2 in [7], shows that local completeness allows to derive for every two acts an
Fti-measurable partition on which a comparison can be achieved.
Lemma 5.3. Consider any g ∈ L∞(Fti), f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1). If Assumption 5.1 holds and
i,i+1 satisfies (T.i) then there exists a pairwise disjoint family of events A,B,C ∈ Fti
such that Pi(A ∪B ∪C) = 1 and
g1A ∼i,i+1 f1A,
g ≻Bi,i+1 f
g ≺Ci,i+1 f.
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Proof. Fix g ∈ L∞(Fti), f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1), and define E := {A˜ ∈ Fti : g1A˜ ∼i,i+1 f1A˜},
S := supA˜∈E Pi(A˜). We can find {An}n ⊆ E such that Pi(An)→ S: we have Pi(∪nAn) ≥
Pi(An) for every n which implies Pi(∪nAn) = S (from (T.i) and Remark 3.5 we have
∪nAn ∈ E). We finally show that up to null events ∪nAn represents the largest event
on which g is conditionally equivalent to f : let A˜ ∈ E and B = A˜ \ (∪nAn). Then
B ∪ (∪nAn) ∈ E and Pi(B ∪ (∪nAn)) = Pi(B) + S. Necessarily Pi(B) = 0.
We therefore set A := ∪nAn and consider U := {B˜ ∈ Fti , B˜ ⊆ A
c : g1B˜ i,i+1 f1B˜}.
Notice that from the construction of A if we find B˜ ∈ U such that g1B˜ ∼i,i+1 f1B˜ then
Pi(B˜) = 0. Following the same argument as in the previous step we construct a maximal
B ∈ U such that Pi(B) ≥ Pi(B˜) for all B˜ ∈ U : indeed it is not possible the finding of
B′ ⊂ B with Pi(B′) > 0 such that g1B′ i,i+1 f1B′ and therefore g ≻Bi,i+1 f .
Finally we can consider D := {C˜ ∈ Fti , C˜ ⊆ (A∪B)
c : g1C˜ i,i+1 f1C˜} and following the
same reasoning we can find C ∈ D such that Pi(C) ≥ Pi(C˜) for all C˜ ∈ D and g ≺Ci,i+1 f .
By construction Pi(A∪B∪C) = 1 and the probability of the intersections is always 0.
Consider for any g ∈ L∞(Fti) the upper and lower level sets C
u
g = {f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1) |
g i,i+1 f} and C
l
g = {f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1) | g i,i+1 f} and the maps
V −i+1(f) = Pi − sup{ui(g) | f ∈ C
u
g } = Pi − sup{ui(g) | g i,i+1 f}
V +i+1(f) = Pi − inf{ui(g) | f ∈ C
l
g} = Pi − inf{ui(g) | g i,i+1 f}
Lemma 5.4. Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). The maps V
+
i+1(f) :
L∞(Fti+1) → L
0(Ω,Fti ,Pi), V
−
i+1(f) : L
∞(Fti+1) → L
0(Ω,Fti ,Pi) are well defined.
Moreover, as ui(ω, ·) is strictly increasing and ⋆-continuous (Assumption 5.1), then V
+
i+1(f) =
V −i+1(f) for any f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1).
Notation 5.5. We shall often use the notation u−1i Vi+1(f) to indicate the function map-
ping ω → u−1i (Vi+1(f)(ω), ω)
7.
Proof. Let g1, g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that Pi(g1 = g2) = 1. We have from Remark 3.5 that
Cug1 = C
u
g2
and Clg1 = C
l
g2
and therefore V +i+1, V
−
i+1 are well defined.
From now on we fix f ∈ L∞(Fti+1): for any g1, g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that g1 i,i+1 f
and g2 i,i+1 f then the set {g1 > g2} ∈ N (Fti). From the monotonicity of ui we have
Pi(ui(g1) ≤ ui(g2)) = 1 and therefore V
−
i+1(f) ≤ V
+
i+1(f), Pi almost surely.
To prove that V −i+1(f) = V
+
i+1(f) we need to find g−, g+ ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that ui(g±) =
V ±i+1(f) Pi−a.s.. We prove the existence of g+, then the same argument works also for g−.
Take a sequence (gn)n∈N ⊆ L (Fti) satisfying gn i,i+1 f , gn+1(ω) ≤ gn(ω) ∀n ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω
and ui(gn(ω), ω) ↓ (V
+
i+1(f))(ω) for each ω ∈ A for some event A ∈ Fti with Pi(A) = 1.
7This function is well defined and measurable as ui(·, ω) is strictly increasing for any ω ∈ Ω.
23
The existence of such sequence is guaranteed by the definition of Pi− inf and the fact that
the set {g ∈ L∞(Fti) : g i,i+1 f} is downward directed
8. Since the prefererence relation
i,i+1 is non degenerate, there exists an act h ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that h i,i+1 f implying
that the event {ω ∈ Ω : h(ω) > gn(ω)} ∈ Fti is null for each n ∈ N. This means that the
sequence (gn)n is decreasing and has a Pi − a.s. finite lower bound, hence there exists an
event B ∈ Fti with Pi(B) = 1 and an act g+ ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that gn(ω) ↓ g+(ω) ∈ R for
all ω ∈ B. The ⋆-contintuity of ui ensures that gn(ω) and g+(ω) belong to the points of
(right) continuity of ui(·, ω) for each ω ∈ C for some C ∈ Fti with Pi(C) = 1. This leads
to:
(V +i+1(f))(ω) = limn
ui(gn(ω), ω) = ui(g+(ω), ω)
for each ω ∈ A ∩B ∩C and Pi(A ∩B ∩ C) = 1.
Consider now A¯ ∈ Fti defined by A¯ := {g− < g+}. For λ ∈ (0, 1) define the convex
combination gλ := λg+ + (1 − λ)g−. Indeed A¯ = {gλ < g+} = {ui(gλ) < ui(g+)} =
{gλ > g−} = {ui(gλ) > ui(g−)}.
Observe that if Pi(A¯) = 0 we have the thesis. Otherwise we claim that for any B ⊆ A¯,
B ∈ Fti , Pi(B) > 0 neither gλ1B i,i+1 f1B nor gλ1B i,i+1 f1B occur. This claim
indeed contradicts local completeness in (T.i).
To show the claim we consider first the case gλ1B i,i+1 f1B for some B ⊆ A¯, B ∈ Fti and
Pi(B) > 0, since the other follows in a similar way. As a consequence of Remark 3.5 we have
gλ1B+g−1Bc i,i+1 f . From the construction B\{ui(gλ1B+g−1Bc) > V
−(f)} is null, but
from the definition Pi − sup we necessarily have {ui(gλ1B + g−1Bc) > V −(f)} ∈ N (Fti).
Therefore gλ1B i,i+1 f1B cannot occur for any for B ⊆ A¯, B ∈ Fti and Pi(B) > 0.
Similarly we can obtain that gλ1B i,i+1 f1B cannot occur for any for B ⊆ A¯, B ∈ Fti
and Pi(B) > 0, concluding the proof of the claim.
Notation 5.6. From now on we shall denote Vi+1 := V
+
i+1 = V
−
i+1.
Proposition 5.7. Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). Then for any f ∈
L∞(Fti+1) there exists a unique Conditional Certainty Equivalent given by Ci,i+1(f) =
u−1i Vi+1(f) ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fti ,Pi). Moreover Vi+1 represents the transition order i.e.
g i,i+1 f ⇔ ui(g) ≤ Vi+1(f) Pi-a.s. (5.12)
g i,i+1 f ⇔ ui(g) ≥ Vi+1(f) Pi-a.s. (5.13)
and necessarily Vi+1(f) ∈ L
1(Ω,Fti ,Pi).
Proof. In this proof we denote (with a slight abuse of notation) by Vi+1(f) any of its
Fti-measurable version. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 5.4.
8A set A is downward directed if for any f, g ∈ A the minimum f∧g ∈ A. The existence of a minimizing
sequence is proved in Appendix A.5 of [13]
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We only need to show that Ci,i+1(f) = u
−1
i Vi+1(f) ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fti ,Pi). For any couple
g1, g2 ∈ L
∞(Fti) such that g1 i,i+1 f and g2 i,i+1 f we can observe that ui(g1) ≤
Vi+1(f) ≤ ui(g2), Pi almost surely, which automatically implies Vi+1(f) ∈ L1(Ω,Fti ,Pi)
(we are assuming ui(·, x) is integrable for any x). At the same time from ui strictly
increasing in x we can deduce g1 ≤ Ci,i+1(f) ≤ g2, Pi almost surely.
To show the representation property (5.12) and (5.13), we consider the case g i,i+1
f as g i,i+1 f follows in a similar fashion. Obviously g i,i+1 f implies Pi(ui(g) ≤
Vi+1(f)) = 1 (from the definition of V
+
i+1 = Vi+1).
For the reverse implication notice that on the set A = {ui(g) = Vi+1(f)} we necessarily
have g1A ∼i,i+1 f1A. If instead we consider A = {ui(g) < Vi+1(f)} then either Pi(A) = 0
or necessary g1A i,i+1 f1A and g1B ≁i,i+1 f1B for any B ⊂ A, B ∈ Fti as Vi+1(f) is by
definition Pi − inf{ui(g) | g i,i+1 f} (This can be easily verified applying (T.i)).
Corollary 5.8. Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). For any f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1)
and A ∈ Fti we have Vi+1(f1A) = Vi+1(f)1A, Pi almost surely.
Proof. From the previous construction we have u−1i Vi+1(f1A) ∼i,i+1 f1A. Moreover from
(T.i) we also have that u−1i Vi+1(f) ∼i,i+1 f implies u
−1
i Vi+1(f)1A ∼i,i+1 f1A. Therefore
from transitivity we deduce u−1i Vi+1(f)1A = u
−1
i Vi+1(f1A), Pi almost surely and hence
the thesis.
Remark 5.9. Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). For any f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1),
g ∈ L∞(Fti) and A ∈ Fti we have g ≺
A
i,i+1 f (resp. g ≻
A
i,i+1 f) implies {ui(g) ≥
Vi+1(f)} ∩A ∈ N (Fti) (resp. {ui(g) ≤ Vi+1(f)} ∩A ∈ N (Fti))
Last step of the proof for (⇒): Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies all the
Axioms (T.i), (M.i), (ST.i) and (C.i). In order to conclude the proof we show that there
exist a probability Pi+1 on (Ω,Fti+1) which agrees with Pi on Fti and a state-dependent
utility ui+1(ω, ·) : R→ R strictly increasing ∀ω ∈ Ω, such that
Vi+1(f) = EPi+1 [ui+1(·, f) | Fti ] Pi-a.s.. (5.14)
We define an intertemporal preference relation between time 0 and ti+1 as a 0,i+1 f
(resp. a 0,i+1 f) if and only if u0(a) ≤ EPi [Vi+1(f)] (resp. u0(a) ≥ EPi [Vi+1(f)]) for any
a ∈ R and f ∈ L∞(Fti+1).
Simple inspections show that 0,i+1 satisfies (T.0), (M.0) and (ST.0).
We now prove the continuity (C.0) of 0,i+1: consider any uniformly bounded sequence
{fn} ⊆ L
∞(Fti+1), such that fn(ω)→ f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Consider a ≺0,i+1 f (the case
a ≻0,i+1 f follows in a similar way) so that we necessarily have u0(a) < EPi [Vi+1(f)]. It is
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possible to find g ∈ L∞(Fti) such that ui(g) < Vi+1(f) and u0(a) < EPi [ui(g)]
9.
Since g ≺i,i+1 f we apply (C.i) and find a sequence of indexes {nk}
∞
k=1 and a partition
{Ak}
∞
k=1 ⊂ Fti such that for any k we have g1Ak i,i+1 fn1Ak for all n ≥ nk.
For BN = ∪
N
i=1Ai and d = supn ‖fn‖∞ consider the CCE Ci,i+1(−d). The se-
quence {ui(g1BN +Ci,i+1(−d)1BcN }N∈N is dominated by the integrable function |ui(g)|+
|ui(Ci,i+1(−d))| and pointwise converges to ui(g). From Dominated Convergence Theorem
we can find N¯ such that
EPi [ui(g1BN¯ + Ci,i+1(−d)1BcN¯ )] > u0(a),
so that from (T.i) we can deduce ui(g1BN¯ + Ci,i+1(−d)1BcN¯ ) ≤ Vi+1(fn1BN¯ − d1B
c
N¯
) for
n > N¯ and
EPi [Vi+1(fn)] ≥ EPi [Vi+1(fn1BN¯ − d1BcN¯ )] > u0(a), ∀n > N¯,
which shows (C.0) of 0,i+1.
Given that 0,i+1 satisfies (T.0), (M.0), (ST.0) and (C.0) premise we can apply Propo-
sition 4.8 and find a probability P˜ on Fti+1 and a state-dependent utility u˜ such that
EPi [Vi+1(f)] = EP˜[u˜(f)] for any f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1).
Notice from (T.i) point 3 that P˜ is equivalent to Pi on Fti . For P˜|Fti being the restriction of
P˜ on Fti define Z =
dPi
dP˜|Fti
, which is an Fti-measurable random variable. For any A ∈ Fti+1
set Pi+1(A) := EP˜[Z1A], ui+1(ω, x) =
dP˜
dPi+1
u˜(ω, x) and notice that Pi+1(A) = Pi(A) for
any A ∈ Fti . We have
EPi [Vi+1(f)] = EP˜[u˜(f)] = EPi+1 [ui+1(f)] = EPi [EPi+1 [ui+1(f) | Fti ]],
so that we can obtain for every A ∈ Fti that
EPi [Vi+1(f)1A] = EPi [Vi+1(f1A)] = EPi [EPi+1 [ui+1(f1A) | Fti ]]
= EPi [EPi+1 [ui+1(f) | Fti ]1A],
which implies the representation (5.14).
We finally show the ⋆-continuity of ui+1. As for the unconditional case, it is enough
to show that for each f ∈ L (Fti+1) it holds that Pi+1(LDf ) = 0 where LDf is de-
fined in Appendix A with respect to the stochastic field ui+1. Notice that, as conse-
quence of Lemma A.1, ∀f ∈ L (Fti+1) then LDf ∈ Fti+1 , hence either Pi+1(LDf ) = 0 or
Pi+1(LDf ) > 0. By contradiction, we assume that there exists an act f∗ ∈ L∞(Fti+1)
9To show the existence of such g we need to consider for any ε > 0, Ci,i+1(f)− ε so that ui(Ci,i+1(f)−
ε) < ui(Ci,i+1(f)) = Vi+1(f); observing that ui(Ci,i+1(f)−ε) increases monotonically to ui(Ci,i+1(f)) (for
any ω ∈ Ω) we can find an ε¯ such that u0(a) < EPi [ui(Ci,i+1(f)− ε¯)] < EPi [ui(Ci,i+1(f))] = EPi [Vi+1(f)].
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for which Pi+1(LDf∗) > 0. In order to simplify the notation we set B := LDf and, since
the probability Pi+1 is fixed, we denote Pi+1 − sup(A) simply with sup(A) for any family
A ⊆ L∞(Fti+1). Define f := f
∗1B and fn :=
(
f − 1
n
)
1B for each n ∈ N. Clearly fn → f
in L∞(Fti+1), ‖fn‖ ≤ ‖f‖+1 < +∞ ∀n and fn(ω) = f(ω) = 0 ∀ω ∈ B
C . By definition of
B, it hods that ui+1(f(ω), ω) > supn ui+1(fn(ω), ω) for Pi+1-a.e. ω ∈ B and, so, we have:
Pi
(
EPi+1[ui+1(f, ·)|Fti ] > supn EPi+1[ui+1(fn, ·)|Fti ]
)
> 0 (5.15)
EPi+1 [ui+1(f, ·)|Fti ] ≥ supn EPi+1 [ui+1(fn, ·)|Fti ] Pi+1 − a.s.
Define now gn := Ci,i+1(fn) and g := Ci,i+1(f). Observe that {gn}n is an increasing
sequence as {fn}n increases and ui(·, ω) is strictly increasing for each ω by Assumption
5.1 and has g as upper bound. If gn(ω)→ g(ω) for Pi-a.e. ω ∈ Ω then, by the ⋆-continuity
of ui, it would happen that ui(gn(ω), ω) → ui(g(ω), ω) for Pi-a.e. ω ∈ Ω in contradiction
with (5.15). Hence, there exists A ∈ Fti with Pi(A) > 0 such that supn gn(ω) < g(ω) for
each ω ∈ A. Take now λ ∈ (0, 1) and consider gλ := λg + (1− λ) supn gn. It holds that:
sup
n
gn(ω) ≤ gλ ≤ g(ω) for Pi − a.e. ω ∈ Ω
sup
n
gn(ω) < gλ < g(ω) for each ω ∈ A
Therefore, it follows that gλ i,i+1 fn and gλ ≻
A
i,i+1 fn ∀n, while gλ i,i+1 f and gλ ≺
A
i,i+1 f
which is in contradiction with axiom (C.i).
On the reverse implication (⇐). We now assume that there exist a probability P on
FtN and a Stochastic Dynamic Utility u(t, x, ω) in the form of (3.6) with properties (a)
(b) (c) and (d). Then, for any i = 1, . . . , N − 1, it is easy to show that the intertemporal
preferences i,i+1,i,i+1 satisfy Axioms (T.i), (M.i), (ST.i), from the properties of the
conditional expectation and the monotonicity of the Stochastic Dynamic Utility.
The only critical point is showing property (C.i). To this aim let {fn} ⊆ L
∞(Fti+1)
be a uniformly bounded sequence, such that fn(ω) → f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Choose any
g ≺i,i+1 f then necessarily P(u(ti, g) ≥ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ]) = 0.
As supn ‖fn‖∞ < d for some d > 0 we build the increasing sequence ln := infk≥n fk ∈
L∞(Fti+1) and notice ln ≤ fn and ln(ω) → f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Moreover ‖ln‖∞ <
d for all n ∈ N and consequently |u(ti+1, ln)| ≤ |u(ti+1, d)| which is integrable. We
can apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem for conditional expectation and obtain
EP[u(ti+1, ln)|Fti ](ω) → EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ](ω) for any ω ∈ Ω (by choosing an opportune
version of the conditional expectation). Consider the sequence of sets {Bn}n∈N ⊂ Fti
defined by
Bk := {u(ti, g) < EP[u(ti+1, lk)|Fti ]}.
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Indeed ∪kBk = Ω from the pointwise convergence and we deduce that the pairwise disjoint
family A1 := B1, . . . , Ak := Bk \ (∪
k−1
i=1Ai) satisfies again ∪kAk = Ω and forms therefore
a partition of Ω. We conclude by observing that for any n ≥ k we have fn ≥ lk and
therefore u(ti, g)(ω) < EP[u(ti+1, fn)|Fti ](ω) for any ω ∈ Ak. Finally for every n ≥ k
we deduce g1Ak i,i+1 fn1Ak , as the follwoing identies u(ti, g)1Bk = u(ti, g1Bk ) and
EP[u(ti+1, fn)|Fti ]1Bk = EP[u(ti+1, fn1Bk)|Fti ] hold P-a.s.. The argument repeats in the
same way when g ≻i,i+1 f .
On the uniqueness. To conclude the proof we need to show the relative uniqueness.
Consider the new couple (P∗, u∗) such that P is equivalent to P∗ on FtN and for any
i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u∗(ti, ·, ·) = δiui) = 1, where δi is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
of P|Fti with respect to P
∗
|Fti
. We show for any arbitrary i = 1, . . . , N−1, g ∈ L∞(Fti), f ∈
L∞(Fti+1) the first of the following equivalences
u∗(ti, g) ≥ EP∗[u
∗(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P
∗-a.s. ⇐⇒ u(ti, g) ≥ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P-a.s.
u∗(ti, g) ≤ EP∗[u
∗(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P
∗-a.s. ⇐⇒ u(ti, g) ≤ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ] P-a.s.,
as the second one is similar. To this aim we recall the martingality property
δi = EP∗
[
dP
dP∗
| Fti
]
= EP∗
|Fti+1
[δi+1 | Fti ] P
∗-a.s..
and the conditional change of measure
EP∗ [δi+1ui+1(f) | Fti ]
EP∗ [δi+1 | Fti ]
= EP [ui+1(f) | Fti ] P-a.s.. (5.16)
Moreover the equivalence between P and P∗ allows to write the following inequalities
indifferently in the P/P∗ almost sure sense so that we obtain
u∗(ti, g) ≥ EP∗ [u
∗(ti+1, f)|Fti ] ⇐⇒ δiui(g) ≥ EP∗ [δi+1ui+1(f)|Fti ]
⇐⇒ δiui(g) ≥ EP[ui+1(f)|Fti ] · EP∗ [δi+1 | Fti ]
⇐⇒ u(ti, g) ≥ EP[u(ti+1, f)|Fti ].
On the contrary suppose that (P∗, u∗) are given in a way such that for i = 1, . . . , N :
EP∗ [|u
∗(ti, x, ·)|] < ∞, for all x ∈ R, u∗(ti, ·, ω) is strictly increasing in x, u∗(ti, 0, ω) = 0
for all ω ∈ Ω and
u∗(ti−1, g) ≥ EP∗ [u
∗(ti, f)|Fti−1 ] P
∗-a.s. ⇐⇒ u(ti−1, g) ≥ EP[u(ti, f)|Fti−1 ] P-a.s.
u∗(ti−1, g) ≤ EP∗ [u
∗(ti, f)|Fti−1 ] P
∗-a.s. ⇐⇒ u(ti−1, g) ≤ EP[u(ti, f)|Fti−1 ] P-a.s.,
for any arbitrary, g ∈ L∞(Fti), f ∈ L
∞(Fti+1). The equivalence of P and P
∗ follows
immediately. Moreover it is important to observe that the preferences i−1,i induced
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by (P, u) and (P∗, u∗) are the same and satisfy all the axioms (in virtue of the previous
point of the proof), which in particular implies that the CCE always exists. Moreover
for any ω ∈ Ω we imposed u(ti, 0, ω) = u
∗(ti, 0, ω) = 0. For i = 1 we already know
P(u∗(t1, ·, ·) = δ1u1) = 1 from Proposition 4.8. Let δi = EP∗
[
dP
dP∗ | Fti
]
as before and
consider the first i = 2, . . . , N such that either the set A = {ω ∈ Ω | u∗(ti, ·, ω) > δiui(·, ω)}
or A = {ω ∈ Ω | u∗(ti, ·, ω) < δiui(·, ω)} have positive probability. Let Ci−1,i(1A) be the
CCE of 1A, which is the equal under (P, u) or (P∗, u∗). Therefore
u∗(ti−1, Ci−1,i(1A)) = EP∗ [u
∗(ti,1A)|Fti−1 ] P
∗-a.s. and (5.17)
u(ti−1, Ci−1,i(1A)) = EP[u(ti,1A)|Fti−1 ] P-a.s.
By performing a conditional change of measure as in (5.16), the second equation can be
rewritten as
δi−1u(ti−1, Ci−1,i(1A)) = EP∗ [δiu(ti,1A)|Fti−1 ] P
∗-a.s..
Subtracting this last equation and (5.17), would lead to a contradiction since the left hand
side is always equal to 0 (P-a.s.) whereas the right hand side is not. Therefore P(A) is
necessarily 0.
A On ⋆-continuity
Throughout this section we fix a probability space (Ω,G,P) and a random field φ : R×Ω→
R such that for each f ∈ L∞(G) the map ω 7→ φ(f(ω), ω) is G-measurable and for any ω,
x 7→ φ(x, ω) is non decreasing. For any f ∈ L∞(G) we set
φ(f(ω)+, ω) = inf
n∈N
φ(f(ω) + 1/n, ω) and φ(f(ω)−, ω) = sup
n∈N
φ(f(ω)− 1/n, ω)
and define the following sets:
RDf = {ω ∈ Ω :
(
φ(f(ω)+, ω)− φ(f(ω), ω)
)
> 0}
LDf = {ω ∈ Ω :
(
φ(f(ω), ω)− φ(f(ω)−, ω)
)
> 0}
Df = {ω ∈ Ω :
(
φ(f(ω)+, ω)− φ(f(ω)−, ω)
)
> 0}
We now prove a useful lemma which allows to give a well-posed definition of continuity
for random fields.
Lemma A.1. For each f ∈ L∞(G) the sets RDf , LDf , Df , defined above, are G-
measurable.
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Proof. Observe that the set RDf can be written as:
RDf =
⋂
n∈N
⋃
m∈N
{
ω ∈ Ω :
(
φ
(
f(ω) +
1
n
, ω
)
− φ(f(ω), ω)
)
>
1
m
}
=
⋂
n∈N
⋃
m∈N
[
φ
(
f(·) +
1
n
, ·
)
− φ (f(·), ·)
]−1( 1
m
,+∞
)
which is G-measurable by measurability of the function
ω → φn(ω) = φ
(
f(ω) +
1
n
, ω
)
− φ(f(ω), ω).
Clearly a similar argument shows that LDf ∈ G. Finally, Df = LDf ∪RDf ∈ G.
Definition A.2. The random fields φ is ⋆-continuous if P(Df ) = 0 for every f ∈ L∞(G).
Remark A.3. Observe that the set Df defined in Lemma A.1 can be interpreted as:
Df = {ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) is a point of discontinuity of the function φ(·, ω)}
In particular for any sequence {fn}n∈N ⊂ L
∞(G) such that fn(ω) → f(ω) we have
φ(fn(ω), ω) → φ(f(ω), ω) for any ω ∈ Df . Moreover it follows that the definition of
⋆-continuity is well posed as the set Df is measurable by Lemma A.1.
Notice also that taking f ≡ x ∈ R then Dx = {ω ∈ Ω : φ(·, ω) is discontinuous in x}.
Therefore, the condition P(Dx) = 0 means that for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω the map φ(·, ω) is contin-
uous in x . On the other hand, if φ is P − a.s. continuous and satisfies the measurability
condition of Lemma A.1 then it is also ⋆-continuous. Hence, the ⋆-continuity is a notion
of continuity which is deeply related to the probability space (in particular, to the σ-algebra)
and is weaker than the P-a.s. continuity of the trajectories but stronger than the P-a.s.
continuity at fixed points.
B State dependent utilities
As in the rest of the paper (Ω,F) denotes a measurable space and L∞(F) is the space
of all acts, represented by real valued F-measurable and bounded random variables. We
here use the term “act ”in order to match the terminology adopted in [30] on which this
Appendix is based. This term must be used with care in order to avoid confusion with
the general notion of Anscombe-Aumann acts. Indeed in [2] acts are functions from the
state space (Ω,F) to a convex set of lotteries over a consequence set.
In this appendix the preference relation is a binary relation  on L∞(F) : for f , g
∈ L∞(F), if f is preferred to g, write f  g. The preference relation satisfies the following
axiom:
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(A1) Preference order: if it is reflexive (∀f ∈ L∞(F), f ∼ f), complete (∀f, g ∈ L∞(F),
f  g or f  g) and transitive (∀f, g, h ∈ L∞(F) such that f  g and g  h then
f  h)
Definition B.1. A representing function of the preference relation is a function V :
L∞(F)→ R which is order-preserving, i.e.,
f  g ⇐⇒ V (f) ≥ V (g).
We use the standard conventions: f  g if g  f ; f ∼ f if both g  f and f  g;
g ≁ f if either g  f or f  g; g ≻ f if g  f but f  g.
Definition B.2. An event A ∈ F is null if f1A + g1Ac ∼ g ∀f, g ∈ L
∞(F).We shall
denote by N (F) be the set of null events.
As a consequence a -atom is an element A ∈ F such that for every B ∈ F with ∅ 6=
B ⊂ A either B or A \B is null.
An event is essential if it belongs to F \ N (F).
We can consider the following additional Axioms:
(A2) Strictly monotone if x1A + f1Ac ≻ y1A + f1Ac , for all nonnull events A ∈ F , for
all f ∈ L∞(F) and outcomes x > y.
(A3) Sure-thing principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ L∞(F) and A ∈ F such that
f1A + h1Ac  g1A + h1Ac then for every c ∈ L
∞(F) we have f1A + c1Ac 
g1A + c1Ac .
(A3) holds on S(F) if we substitute in the previous statement L∞(F) with S(F)
(as defined in the paragraph Notations).
(A4’) Norm continuity if ∀f ∈ L∞(F) the sets {g ∈ L∞(F) : g  f} and {g ∈ L∞(F) :
f  g} are ‖ · ‖∞-closed.
Theorem B.3 (Debreu 1960, state-dependent expected utility for finite state space).
Let L∞(F) the set of acts and  a preference relation on it. Let the state space Ω =
{ω1, ..., ωn}, where at least three states are nonnull. Then the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) There exist n continuous functions Vj : R → R, j = 1, ..., n, that are strictly in-
creasing for all nonnull states and constant for all null states, and such that  is
represented by
V (f) =
n∑
j=1
Vj(f(ωj)). (B.18)
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(ii)  is a norm continuous, strictly monotonic preference order that satisfies the sure
thing principle.
The following uniqueness holds for (1) : W (f) =
∑n
j=1Wj(f(ωj)) represent  if and
only if there exist τ1, ..., τn ∈ R and σ > 0 such that Wj = τj + σVj ∀j, implying that
W = τ + σV for τ = τ1 + ...+ τn.
In [30] the previous Theorem is generalized to an infinite state spaces Ω when Ω
contains no atoms. We here recall the integral reformulation of the Debreu representation
given in [4] under pointwise continuity.
Definition B.4. A preference order is
(A4) Pointwise continuous if for any uniformly bounded sequence {fn} ⊆ L
∞(F), such
that fn(ω)→ f(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω then ∀g ∈ L
∞(F) such that g ≻ f (resp. g ≺ f)
∃J ∈ N such that g ≻ f j (resp. g ≺ f j) ∀j > J .
Theorem B.5 ([30], Theorem 12 and [4], Theorem 5). Let L∞(F) be the set of acts and
 the preference relation on it. Assume that F contains at least three disjoint essential
events. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a countably additive measure P on Ω and a function (the state-dependent
utility) u(ω, ·) : R→ R strictly increasing ∀ω ∈ Ω, such that  is represented by the
pointwise continuous integral
f →
∫
Ω
u(ω, f(ω))dP.
(ii)  satisfies: (A1), (A2), (A3) on S(F), (A4).
The following uniqueness holds: the couple (P, u) can be replaced by (P∗, u∗) if and only
if P and P∗ are equivalent and P(u∗ = τ + σδu) = 1, where τ : Ω → R is F-measurable,
σ > 0 and δ is the Radon-Nikodym density function of P with respect to P∗.
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